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Can a Copycat Effect 
be Observed in 
Terrorist Suicide 
Attacks? 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore how a copycat effect – 
established within the field of suicide studies – may manifest itself 
in terrorist suicide attacks, and takes an exploratory approach in 
evaluating the prospect of incorporating open-data resources in 
future counter-terrorism research. This paper explores a possible 
‘copycat effect’ in cases of suicide terrorism, which entails a 
perpetrator being inspired by a preceding attack to carry out a 
similar attack not long after the original. In the wake of mounting 
risks of lone wolf terrorist attacks today and due to the general 
difficulties faced in preventing such attacks, in this paper we 
explore a potential area of future prevention in media reporting, 
security and anti-terrorism policies today. Using the START Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), this paper investigates terrorist suicide-
attack clusters and analyses the relationship between attacks 
found within the same cluster. Using a mixed-method approach, 
our analyses did not uncover clear evidence supporting a copycat 
effect among the studied attacks. These and other findings have 
numerous policy and future research implications. 
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 Introduction 
 
Mass media has an enormous influential power, extending to the power of imitation. A 
copycat effect has long been established among cases of suicide, linking the influence 
of mass media reporting on suicide cases to subsequent suicides by its viewers or 
readers. Also known as the ‘contagion effect’, and referred to along the lines of 
‘imitation’, ‘mimesis’ and ‘clusters’, the copycat effect refers to the influential power of 
mass communication and media to create a wave of similar behaviours amongst a 
given reader- or viewership. A copycat suicide may incorporate aspects of an original 
offence into a new suicide case – or in the case of terrorism, into a new suicide attack. 
The copycat effect was first identified in a landmark study conducted by American 
sociologist David P. Phillips, who documented a significant rise in the suicide rate after 
stories of suicides were publicised by the press in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom.1 While subsequent research has successfully determined that the media’s 
publicising of a suicide has a significant effect upon suicidal behaviour amongst its 
reader- or viewership,2 studies on copycat effects are rarely found within other fields. 
To this, the field of counter-terrorism studies is no exception. 
 
So far, it remains unclear to what extent such a copycat effect can be established in 
suicide terrorism. Given the major suicide component to this type of attack, through 
this analysis we seek to ascertain whether or not a copycat effect can be observed in 
terrorist suicide attacks today. According to the START Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD), suicide attacks accounted for approximately 19 percent of all terrorist attacks 
occurring between 1970 and 2015, and are rapidly gaining greater strategic importance 
among terrorist organisations today, with total annual suicide terrorist attacks having 
increased by 1,679 percent since the beginning of the War on Terror in 2001. As a result, 
counter-terrorism experts are increasingly seeking out innovative approaches to 
preventing and dealing with the modern threat of suicide terrorism. Furthermore, 
modern terrorist organisations such as so-called Islamic State (IS) continue to rely on 
high-exposure suicide attacks and the greater subsequent international attention they 
receive in order to capture public attention and inspire terror. 3  As a result, a 
multidisciplinary approach recognising the role of mass media and its potential effects 
on suicidal behaviour may shed new light on suicide terrorism and its various drivers, 
and thus how their associated risks may be mitigated. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
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Further exploring the imitative effect of mass media may be particularly relevant to 
counter-terrorist researchers primarily interested in the motivations and conditions 
that encourage future suicide attacks. Because of the link between media reports on 
suicide and subsequent suicides, one may question to what extent media reports on 
suicide terrorism are likewise associated with subsequent attacks. 
 
The Evidence So Far 
 
So far, Phillips’ findings have only scarcely been extended outside the realm of suicide 
studies, such as in homicide-suicides.4 This can partially be attributed to the low N of 
such cases, hampering a quantitative enquiry such as the one employed by Phillips. A 
search of the existing empirical literature on the copycat effect,5 for example, revealed 
that publication of suicide cases leads to a significant increase in the suicide rate 
following publication, particularly if a newspaper article is associated with images, gives 
a detailed description of the suicide method and is glorifying or romanticising in nature 
(see Figure 1).6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
  
Figure 1: Prior research studies investigating the relationship between media suicide 
reporting and suicide rates  
 
 
 
Evidence for copycat effects outside the realm of suicide is scarce at best. Prior studies 
on child homicide, and homicide followed by suicide, failed to find evidence pointing 
towards a copycat effect.7 
 
Given their vast societal impact, school shootings have also been the subject of copycat 
research. Even though sample sizes of such events are very small, hampering 
quantitative analyses, there is some anecdotal evidence that imitative behaviour has 
played a role in several school shootings. In 2013, for example, American teenager 
Grant Acord was arrested for planning a ‘Columbine-style’ attack at his high school in 
Oregon. He had in his possession a number of checklists and schematics that used the 
1999 shooting spree at the Colorado high school as inspiration.8 The prominent case 
of Columbine, the most covered story of 1999 and second-most-covered emergent 
news event of the 1990s,9 was considered a surpassable goal by Acord. Other students 
have similarly studied the Columbine attacks prior to their own mass shootings. Charles 
Andrew Williams, the perpetrator of a school shooting in Santee, California in 2001, had 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
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revealed his intentions to friends that he was going to “pull a Columbine” only weeks 
prior to the attack itself. 10  The student responsible for a school shooting in 
Hillsborough, North Carolina in 2006 had sent an email confession to the principle of 
Columbine High School prior to his attack.11 
 
Modern-day terrorist organisations have increasingly published extremist material 
online in the form of digital magazines and videos. These materials typically have a 
value-reinforcing effect that empowers their ideological and strategic narratives and 
generates a sense of solidarity among ideologically compatible readers.12 As a result, 
similar radicalised, at-risk individuals may choose to follow in other terrorists’ footsteps, 
and may follow a similar process of inspiration and execution as detailed above. 
 
For example, in preparation for the 2016 Nice attack, perpetrator Mohamed Lahouaiej-
Bouhlel is said to have researched previous terror attacks such as the June 2016 
Orlando shooting, as well as one committed by a local man who purposefully drove his 
car into a terrace café in Nice, in January earlier that year.13 Instances such as these give 
credence to the idea that cases covered by the media can provide individuals with a 
cultural “script”.14 They may falsely identify with the protagonist (for example, they may 
suffer from depression, financial troubles or helplessness), and copy the “solution” 
(namely, the violent event) presented in the script. Incidents of mass homicide and their 
links to past media coverage demonstrate a possible area of future prevention that 
may warrant further exploration by researchers interested in security and violence 
prevention policy. Phillips’ copycat effect would suggest that the media exposure given 
to suicide attacks is capable of triggering an individual to imitate such attacks after 
being exposed to the story. In the case of terrorism, an at-risk reader or viewer of media 
news reporting on a suicide attack might be triggered, due to their shared risk factors, 
to replicate attacks and thereby gain a similar position of prestige and sense of 
reverence and heroism among their extremist peers – a key factor used by terrorist 
organisations today when recruiting prospective bombers.15 
 
 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
 The Copycat Effect and the Leaderless 
Resistance Model 
 
In order to systematically assess whether previous suicide attacks may lead to future 
ones, a distinction needs to be made between (a) attacks attributed to organisations 
and (b) attacks carried out by unaffiliated individuals. Attacks directly organised by 
terrorist organisations aim to achieve specific strategic or political goals. For the purpose 
of this paper, given their organisational focus, individuals carrying out attacks in the 
name of their organisation are arguably less likely to be influenced by a copycat effect. 
In contrast, independent perpetrators of suicide attacks theoretically fit the concept of a 
‘copycat’ more closely. For independently operating individuals, exposure to media 
coverage is thought to be more readily linked to a copycat suicide attack, as fewer 
strategic, political and/or doctrinal factors need to be taken into consideration. Such 
individuals are a key component of a concept that has become known today as the 
Leaderless Resistance Model.16 Here, cells of individuals operate outside of vertical 
command links or direct communication with a centralised and hierarchical power. To 
challenge established institutions, their actions range from vandalism to violent 
terrorism. This is not to say that these individuals operate in a vacuum. Terrorist 
organisations today such as IS and al Qaeda encourage Western Muslims to commit 
acts of terror independently, posing a security risk to governments who rely largely 
upon methods of network analysis to detect and counter terrorism risks within their 
borders. Because of the individual nature of such attacks, our analysis will largely focus 
upon interval periods containing suicide attacks committed by independent 
perpetrators, especially those following suicide attacks committed by terrorist 
organisations. Whilst acknowledging the often fuzzy or network-like structure of 
terrorist groups, for the purpose of this study we define independent perpetrators as 
individuals who were, at the time of the attack, not formally affiliated with terrorist 
organisations, and whose attacks were not claimed by a terrorist organisation. We 
define suicide attacks attributed by a terrorist organisation as such, if there is clear 
evidence that an organisation publicly claimed responsibility for the event. This method 
of categorisation mirrors that of the GTD, and ensures that our own method and 
findings remain wholly compatible with the data set itself. 
 
This policy paper seeks to assess whether a copycat effect can be observed in terrorist 
suicide attacks committed across the world, by determining if (I) suicide attacks occur 
in regional clusters, and if (II) in these suicide attacks similar methods are employed 
that fit into a general pattern matching what would be suggested based on Phillips’ 
suicide copycat effect. We conduct our analysis by global region, as a proxy measure to 
determine whether perpetrators could have been aware of preceding suicide attacks 
that appeared in print news media in that particular region. We further take into 
consideration the Leaderless Resistance Model by focusing on (III) the perpetration of 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
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subsequent independent suicide attacks by individuals not formally affiliated with 
terrorist organisations. 
 
Methods 
 
The START Global Terrorism Database and Open-Source Data 
 
We obtained our data on suicide attacks from the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The 
GTD is an open-source database detailing terrorist events that have been reported by 
media outlets throughout the world between the years 1970 and 2014. There are 
numerous advantages of using open-data resources, as they can be updated nearly 
instantaneously, in some instances making even recent cases available for inclusion in 
systematic research. Furthermore, it also eliminates the need for researchers to 
compile their own data, cutting costs and reducing the considerable time investment 
needed to prepare for analysis. There are, however, numerous disadvantages 
associated with the use of open-data resources, which will be discussed later in this 
paper. 
 
Selection Criteria 
 
The GTD consists of a systematic set of variables detailing individual terrorist events 
that have been recorded by media sources from all around the world between 1970 
and 2014 (n = 141,966). We narrowed our sample size by selecting only relevant 
terrorist attack cases associated with the suicide of the perpetrator (where the 
categorical variable “suicide” is equal to 1, n = 3795).17 We further narrowed this sample 
size by selecting only the cases that occurred in the print and broadcast media period, 
prior to the social media period which took off in 2007 (n = 881). Figure 2 reflects the 
selection of cases. 
 
Figure 2: Flowchart of case selection process  
 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
 In this study, we choose to focus on the pre-2007 period and focus on Phillips’ 
hypothesised effect of print and broadcast media, rather than online media. In order 
to accurately assess this effect, 2007 was chosen as a cut-off point, as by that year 
Facebook had been opened for public access, Twitter was formed as an independent 
company and the Apple iPhone was released. All of these events have had major 
impacts upon the evolution and growing increase of social media.18 On a more general 
note, the growing prevalence of the internet has also increased the availability of 
extremist material online and today better fosters the growth of “autodidactic 
extremists”,19 who can not only access a wide range of information regarding attack 
methods and targets online, but can also can take inspiration from historical instances 
of suicide attacks that occurred further in the past and have since been recorded on 
the internet. In short, to focus our analysis on possible copycat effects by print and 
broadcast media, we use the year 2007 as a cut-off point.  
 
Modifications to the GTD Data Set 
 
We modified existing variables in the GTD data set. Firstly, we reclassified Afghanistan 
as a “Middle East” region, instead of belonging to the “South Asia” region, to reflect 
sociopolitical connections to the region.20 To determine the time interval between two 
subsequent attacks, a new variable, daycount, was then created based upon a 
continuous day scale.21 In his original study, Philips applied a three-day period, after 
which a copycat effect may cause an imitative suicide. 22  However, due to the 
considerably longer planning period a suicide attack requires before its execution, we 
have chosen to extend our investigation period to a total of 30 days. Our main unit of 
investigation is thus the attacks falling within 30-day periods, hereafter referred to as 
intervals.23 Based on the variable daycount, we created a new variable (labelled interval), 
classifying cases within 30-day periods in order to group them chronologically. Attacks 
occurring on the same day were considered by our selection criterion to be ineligible 
for evaluation of a copycat effect. 
 
Mixed-Method Approach 
 
After this point we followed a mixed-method approach to analyse the clusters that 
emerged as a result of these groupings. While quantitative analytical methods such as 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
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cluster or regression analyses were considered and explored as potential approaches 
for our analysis, the nature of the GTD made such prospects unfeasible. This was 
largely due to low suicide attack frequencies in regions such as North America or 
Western Europe, which in turn led to small sample sizes. The recording of most attack 
details as nominal variables also inhibited the prospect of a purely quantitative 
approach. 
 
Analytical Strategy 
 
First, in order to assess if (I) suicide attacks occurred in regional clusters, we conducted 
frequency analyses of cases occurring within 30-day periods by region. These regional 
clusters were used as a proxy measure to establish if perpetrators could have been 
aware of preceding suicide attacks that appeared in print news media in that particular 
region. Attacks occurring immediately before or after the interval periods (for example, 
one or two days outside the 30-day cluster periods) were included in the analysis on a 
case-by-case basis.24 
 
Second, in order to assess if (II) similar attack methods were employed, a qualitative 
analysis was applied investigating similar attack methods, targets or other related 
details (stored within the data set as nominal variables). The qualitative analysis of 
chronological suicide attack clusters was performed on a regional basis; however, for 
cases that were deemed noteworthy due to their high exposure or high public impact, 
our analysis investigated identical attack methods across multiple regions in order to 
determine whether a copycat effect could be observed elsewhere at the time. An 
example of this may be suicide terrorist attacks occurring aboard an international flight 
en route to its destination. While a copycat perpetrator may not attempt to carry out 
an identical attack within the same region, it is worth investigating whether an attempt 
was made in other regions at the time. 
 
Once suicide terrorist attack clusters were identified, we applied a qualitative approach 
on the basis of the degree of likeness exhibited across cases. The evaluation of the 
degree of likeness across clustered attacks involved the examination of the following 
elements for each case: 
 
1. Target type (targtype) 
 
a. (detailing information on the victims of the attack, i.e. “Business” or 
“Tourists”) 
 
2. Weapon type (weaptype) 
 
a. (detailing choice of weapons used in the attack, i.e. “Firearms” or 
“Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite”) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
  
3. Group name (gname) 
 
a. (detailing the name of the group who carried out the attack, i.e. “Al-
Qaeda” or “Individual(s)”) 
 
Third, in order to examine (III) the perpetration of subsequent attacks by unaffiliated 
individuals, we assessed those clusters in depth that contained attacks either 
unattributed to a particular organisation or attributed to an independent perpetrator 
(coded in the database as “unknown” and “independent” respectively). Cases in which 
an attack perpetrated by a terrorist organisation and subsequent attacks perpetrated 
by an independent perpetrator shared identical attack details were noted as possibly 
occurring as a result of a copycat effect. All statistical analyses were performed using 
SPSS 23.0 for Mac OSX (SPSS Inc., Chicago IL, USA) unless otherwise stated. 
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Findings 
 
Our findings are hereafter examined by region, as they are organised within the GTD. 
The data is presented first in graphic form through the use of scatter plots and are 
further visualised in the form of a summary table. The summary tables give an overview 
of the details across the attacks found within a cluster, but are only compiled if our 
selection criteria can successfully identify attack clusters within the region. Overall, our 
findings failed to indicate an apparent manifestation of a copycat effect in suicide 
terrorist attacks occurring in any region during our observed time period. 
 
North America 
 
Graph 1: North America, 1981–2007 
 
 
 
According to our selection criteria, within North America no suicide attack clusters 
could be identified.25 It should, however, be noted that within the studied time period, 
highly publicised cases occurred in which perpetrators ascribed their violent actions to 
prior actions. 
 
One concerned an attack carried out by American teenager Charles Bishop who, citing 
sympathy with al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden in a suicide note,26 crashed a stolen civil 
utility aircraft into the Bank of America headquarters in Tampa, Florida. Although 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
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 occurring within a different interval period and thus ineligible for formal analysis due 
to our selection criteria, the identical attack type, target and an explicit reference to a 
preceding attack by the perpetrator makes this a case in point. 
 
We also examined attacks following the 1999 Columbine High School massacre, an 
event which – as noted before – has attracted much attention from perpetrators of 
copycat incidents of mass homicide. While there are seven other instances of suicide 
terrorist attacks targeting educational institutions found within the data set that 
employed similar methods, none fall within the same or adjacent interval periods, and 
thus do not fit our selection criteria. 
 
Central America and the Caribbean 
 
Graph 2: Central America and the Caribbean, 1981–2007 
 
 
 
The Central America and Caribbean region sustained one suicide terrorist attack within 
our observed time period. On 19 July 1994, the terrorist organisation Ansar Allah27 
bombed Alas Chiricanas Flight 901 while on route to Panama City from Colón. While we 
identified eight other suicide attacks in the database as targeting an airport or aircraft, 
none were classified within the same or adjacent interval periods. In short, no evidence 
of a copycat effect could be identified within the region. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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South America 
 
Graph 3: South America, 1981–2007 
 
 
 
 
 
According to our selection criteria, one suicide attack cluster of two attacks could be 
identified within the South America region.28 Within this cluster, the attacks shared 
methods (bombing/explosion) and target type (military). However, these attacks 
occurred only one day after another. Given the amount of preparation required for such 
attacks, the likelihood of these attacks resulting from copycat behaviour seems low. 
With the exception of this single cluster, no other clusters could be identified within the 
region. 
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 East Asia 
 
Graph 4: East Asia, 1981–2007 
 
 
 
As Graph 4 illustrates, according to our selection criteria no suicide attack clusters could 
be identified within the region of East Asia within our time period.  
 
South-East Asia 
 
Graph 5: South-East Asia, 1981–2007 
 
 
As Graph 5 illustrates, according to our selection criteria, no suicide attack clusters 
could be identified within the region of South-East Asia.29  
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South Asia 
 
Graph 6: South Asia, 1981–2007 
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Clusters n Attack type Target type Target sub-type Weapon type Weapon sub-type Unknown/Independent
?I (156/157) 2 Assassination (1/2), 
Bombing/Explosion (1/2)
Violent Political 
Party (1/2), 
Military (1/2)
Party 
Official/Candidate/Other 
Personnel (1/2), Navy (1/2)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (2/2) Unknown explosive type 
(1/2), Other explosive 
type (1/2)
NO
II (168) 4 Bombing/Explosion (4/4) Military (3/4) Navy (3/4) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (3/4) Unknown Explosive 
Type (3/4)
NO
III (169) 3 Bombing/Explosion (3/3) Military (2/3) Military 
Barracks/Base/Headquarters/C
heckpost (2/3)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (3/3) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (2/3)
NO
IV (170) 3 Bombing/Explosion (2/3) Police (1/3) Police Building (headquarters, 
station, school) (1/3)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (2/3) Unknown Gun Type 
(1/3)
NO
V (181/182) 3 Bombing/Explosion (3/3) Police (2/3) Police Patrol (1/2), Police 
Security Forces (1/2)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (3/3) Unknown Explosive 
Type (2/3)
NO
VI (192) 3 Bombing/Explosion (3/3) Business (2/3) Hotel/Resort (2/3) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (3/3) Vehicle (2/3) NO
VII (195/196) 4 Bombing/Explosion (4/4) Military (2/4), 
Religious 
Figures/Institutio
ns (2/4)
Navy (1/4) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (4/4) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (1/4)
NO
VIII (197) 4 Bombing/Explosion (4/4) Military (2/4), 
Transportation 
(2/4)
Navy (2/4) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (4/4) Vehicle (2/4), Suicide 
(carried bodily by human 
being) (2/4)
NO
IX (199/200) 3 Bombing/Explosion (3/3) Military (1/3) Army (1/3) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (3/3) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (2/3)
YES
X (214) 4 Bombing/Explosion (4/4) Maritime (1/4) Commercial Maritime (1/4) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (4/4) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (4/4)
NO
XI (215) 2 Assassination (1/2), 
Bombing/Explosion (1/2)
Government 
(General) (1/2), 
Military (1/2)
Navy (1/2), Politician or 
Political Party 
Movement/Meeting/Rally 
(1/2)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (2/2) Unknown Explosive 
Type (1/2), Suicide 
(carried bodily by human 
being (1/2)
NO
XII (219) 3 Bombing/Explosion (3/3) Government 
(General) (2/3)
Head of State (1/3) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (3/3) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (3/3)
NO
XIII (223/224) 4 Bombing/Explosion (3/4) Military (3/4) Military 
Barracks/Base/Headquarters/C
heckpost (1/4)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (3/4) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (3/4)
NO
XIV (225) 3 Bombing/Explosion (2/3) Military (2/3) Government Personnel 
(excluding police, military) 
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (3/3) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (2/3)
NO
XV (227/228) 4 Bombing/Explosion (4/4) Military (2/4) Army (1/4) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (4/4) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (3/4)
YES
XVI (229/230) 4 Bombing/Explosion (3/4) Government 
(General) (2/4), 
Military (2/4)
Politician or Political Party 
Movement/Meeting/Rally 
(2/4)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (4/4) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (2/4)
NO
XVII (240/241) 3 Bombing/Explosion (2/3) Military (1/3) Navy (1/3) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (2/3) Unknown Gun Type 
(1/3)
NO
XVIII (242) 3 Bombing/Explosion (3/3) Maritime (1/3) Oil tanker (1/3) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (3/3) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (3/3)
NO
XIX (248) 2 Armed Assault (1/2), 
Bombing/Explosion (1/2)
Military (2/2) Military Personnel (soldiers, 
troops, officers, forces) (1/2), 
Military 
Barracks/Base/Headquarters/C
heckpost (1/2)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (1/2), 
Firearms (1/2)
Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (1/2), 
Automatic Weapon (1/2)
NO
XX (263) 2 Bombing/Explosion (2/2) Military (1/2), 
Business (1/2)
Military 
Barracks/Base/Headquarters/C
heckpost (1/2), 
Retail/Grocery/Bakery (1/2)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (2/2) Grenade (1/2), Suicide 
(carried bodily by human 
being (1/2)
YES
XXI (271/272) 2 Armed Assault (1/2), 
Bombing/Explosion (1/2)
Police (1/2), 
Religious 
Figures/Institutio
ns (1/2)
Police Patrol (including 
vehicles and convoys) (1/2), 
Place of Worship (1/2)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (2/2) Automatic weapon (1/2), 
Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (1/2)
NO
XXII (277) 2 Bombing/Explosion (2/2) Religious 
Figures/Insitution
s (2/2)
Place of Worship (2/2) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (2/2) Other Explosive Type 
(1/2), Suicide (carried 
bodily by human being 
(1/2)
YES
XXIII (285) 2 Bombing/Explosion (2/2) Religious 
Figures/Insitution
s (2/2)
Unknown, (1/2) Place of 
Worship (1/2)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (2/2) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (2/2)
YES
XXIV 
(290/291)
7 Bombing/Explosion (7/7) Government 
(General) (5/7)
Judge/Attorney/Court (5/7) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (7/7) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (3/7)
NO
XXV (294) 2 Bombing/Explosion (2/2) Private Citizens 
& Property (1/2), 
Government 
(Diplomatic) (1/2)
Procession/Gathering (funeral, 
wedding, birthday, religious) 
(1/2), Unknown (1/2)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (2/2) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (1/2), 
Vehicle (1/2)
NO
XXVI 
(295/296)
3 Bombing/Explosion (3/3) Military (2/3) Navy (1/3) Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (3/3) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (2/3)
NO
XXVII (297) 2 Bombing/Explosion (2/2) Military (2/2) Military Unit/Patrol/Convoy 
(1/2), Military Personnel 
(soldiers, troops, officers, 
forces) (1/2)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (2/2)  Vehicle (1/2), Unknown 
Explosive Type (1/2)
YES
XXVIII (302) 3 Bombing/Explosion (3/3) Military (2/3) Military 
Barracks/Base/Headquarters/C
heckpost (2/3)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (3/3) Vehicle (3/3) YES
XXIX 
(303/304)
4 Bombing/Explosion (4/4) Government (2/4) Government Personnel 
(excluding police, military) 
(2/4)
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite (4/4) Suicide (carried bodily by 
human being) (3/4)
YES
 18 
According to our selection criteria, 29 suicide attack clusters were identified within the 
region of South Asia.30 Of these, eight clusters contain attacks either unattributed to, 
or perpetrated by an actor not formally affiliated with, a terrorist organisation. Two of 
these concerned attacks with identical attack details, as both employed explosives. Due 
to our primary aim of evaluating the future research possibilities yielded by the GTD as 
well as the limited amount of detailed information found within it, we could not firmly 
conclude whether these individuals in fact copied one another and further stress the 
need for future research on the subject to use media data in order to draw more 
definitive conclusions on specific instances such as these. 
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Graph 7: Central Asia, 1981–2007 
 
 
 
 
Clusters n Attack type Target 
type 
Target sub-type Weapon 
type 
Weapon 
sub-type 
Unknown/ 
Independent
? 
I (271) 2 Bombing/Explosion 
(1/2), Armed 
Assault (1/2) 
Private 
Citizens 
& 
Property 
(1/2), 
Police 
(1/2) 
Unnamed 
Civilian/Unspecified 
(1/2), Police Security 
Forces/Officers (1/2) 
Explosives/
Bombs/ 
Dynamite 
(2/2) 
Suicide 
(carried 
bodily 
by 
human 
being) 
(2/2) 
YES 
 
According to our selection criteria, one suicide attack cluster could be identified within 
the region of Central Asia.31 However, as the table above shows, the details of the 
attacks within this cluster varied widely, were aimed at different targets and included 
different types of attack. Based on these differences, we did not find clear indications 
for a copycat effect within the region within the studied time span.  
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Graph 8: Western Europe, 1981–2007 
 
 
According to our selection criteria, one suicide attack cluster can be identified within 
the region of Western Europe, namely those related to the 7/7 London bombings.32 
However, all attacks took place on the same day and, as a result, were not deemed to 
have been triggered by prior publication of an attack.  
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Graph 9: Eastern Europe, 1981–2007 
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According to our selection criteria, seven suicide attack clusters were identified 
within the region of Eastern Europe. Of these, one cluster contained attacks 
either unattributed to, or perpetrated by an actor not formally affiliated with, 
a terrorist organisation. However, as the summary table reflects, the attacks 
within this cluster did not share identical attack details, providing no clear 
evidence of a copycat effect in the region within our studied time period.  
 
  
Clusters n Attack 
type
Target 
type
Target sub-
type
Weapon type Weapon 
sub-type
Unknown/In
dependent?
I (224/224) 9 Bombing/
Explosion 
(9/9)
Military (8/9) Military 
Barracks/Base/He
adquarters/Check
post (4/9)
Explosives/Bombs/
Dynamite (9/9)
Vehicle (6/9) NO
II (231) 2 Bombing/
Explosion 
(2/2)
Police (2/2) Police Building 
(headquarters, 
station, school) 
(2/2)
Explosives/Bombs/
Dynamite (2/2)
Vehicle (2/2) NO
III (256) 2 Bombing/
Explosion 
(2/2)
Government 
(General) (1/2), 
Unknown (1/2)
Government 
Building/Facility/
Office (1/2), 
Unknown (1/2)
Explosives/Bombs/
Dynamite (2/2)
Vehicle (1/2), 
Suicide (carried 
bodily by 
human being 
(1/2)
NO
IV (260) 3 Bombing/
Explosion 
(2/3)
Government 
(General) (2/3)
Intelligence (1/3) Explosives/Bombs/
Dynamite (3/3)
Suicide (carried 
bodily by 
human being) 
(2/3)
YES
V (261/262) 3 Bombing/
Explosion 
(3/3)
Military (1/3) Military 
Transportation/V
ehicle (excluding 
convoys) (1/3)
Explosives/Bombs/
Dynamite (3/3)
Suicide (carried 
bodily by 
human being) 
(2/3)
NO
VI (267) 2 Bombing/
Explosion 
(2/2)
Transportation 
(1/2), Business 
(1/2)
Train/Train 
Tracks/Trolley 
(1/2), 
Hotel/Resort 
Explosives/Bombs/
Dynamite (2/2)
Suicide (carried 
bodily by 
human being) 
(2/2)
NO
VII (276) 3 Bombing/
Explosion 
(2/3)
Transportation 
(2/3)
Subway (2/3) Explosives/Bombs/
Dynamite (3/3)
Suicide (carried 
bodily by 
human being) 
(2/3)
NO
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Graph 10: Middle East and North Africa 
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 Clusters n Attack type Target type Target sub-type Weapon type Weapon sub-type Unknown/In
dependent?
I	(43) 3 Bombing/Explosion	
(3/3)
Police	(2/3) Police	Checkpoint	(2/3) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Unknown	Explosive	Type	
(3/3)
NO
II	(45) 4 Bombing/Explosion	
(4/4)
Terrorists/Non-
State	Militia	
Non-State	Militia	(2/4) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Unknown	Explosive	Type	
(4/4)
YES
III	(158) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Military	(2/2) Army	(1/2),	Military	
Transportation/Vehicle	
(excluding	convoys)	(1/2)
Unknown	
(2/2)
Unknown	(2/2) YES
IV	(172) 3 Bombing/Explosion	
(3/3)
Transportation	
(2/3)
Unknown	(1/3) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Unknown	Explosive	Type	
(2/3)
NO
V	(173) 3 Bombing/Explosion	
(3/3)
Transportation	
(1/3)
Bus	(excluding	tourists)	(1/3) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Unknown	Explosive	Type	
(3/3)
NO
VI	(205) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	(2/2)
Unknown	(1/2),	
Marketplace/Plaza/Square	
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(1/2),	Suicide	
(carried	bodily	by	human	
NO
VII	(206) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Military	(1/2),	
Business	(1/2)
Unknown	(1/2),	Military	
Unit/Patrol/Convoy	(1/2)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(1/2),	
YES
VIII	(209) 3 Bombing/Explosion	
(3/3)
Government	
(General)	(2/3)
Marketplace/Plaza/Square	
(1/3)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(2/3)
YES
IX	(210) 6 Bombing/Explosion	
(4/6)
Police	(2/6) Politician	or	Political	Party	
Movement/Meeting/Rally	
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(6/6)
YES
X	(215) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Police	(1/2),	
Unknown	(1/2)
Police	Checkpoint	(1/2),	
Unknown	(1/2)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(2/2)
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(1/2),	
Unknown	Explosive	Type	
NO
XI	(219) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	
(1/2),	Military	
Vehicles/Transportation	
(1/2),	Unknown	(1/2)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(2/2)
Vehicle	(2/2) NO
XII	(229) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Military	(2/2) Navy	(1/2),	Military	
Barracks/Base/Headquarters/
Checkpost	(1/2)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(2/2)
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(2/2)
NO
XIII	(232) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Police	(1/2),	
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	(1/2)
Police	Building	(headquarters,	
station,	school)	(1/2),	
Unnamed	
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(2/2)
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(2/2)
NO
XIV	(234) 3 Bombing/Explosion	
(3/3)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	(2/3)
Unnamed	
Civilian/Unspecified	(2/3)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/3)
NO
XV	(236) 4 Bombing/Explosion	
(4/4)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	(2/4)
Marketplace/Plaza/Square	
(1/4)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/4)
YES
XVI	(238) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Police	(1/2),	
Transportation	
(1/2)
Police	Building	(headquarters,	
station,	school)	(1/2),	
Train/Train	Tracks/Trolley	
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(2/2)
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(4/4)
NO
XVII	(239) 4 Bombing/Explosion	
(4/4)
Business	(2/4) Bus	(excluding	tourists)	(1/4) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(4/4)
YES
XVIII	(240) 5 Bombing/Explosion	
(5/5)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	(1/5)
Unknown	(2/5) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(5/5)
YES
XIX	(241) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	
(1/2),	Police	
Unnamed	
Civilian/Unspecified	(1/2),	
Military	Unit/Patrol/Convoy	
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(2/2)
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(2/2)
NO
XX	(243) 6 Bombing/Explosion	
(6/6)
Military	(2/6) Military	
Barracks/Base/Headquarters/
Checkpost	(2/6)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(6/6)
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(6/6)
YES
XXI	(244) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Transportation	
(1/2),	Private	
Citizens	&	
Bus	Station/Stop	(1/2),	
Unnamed	
Civilian/Unspecified	(1/2)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(2/2)
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(2/2)
NO
XXII	(245) 8 Bombing/Explosion	
(7/8)
Business	(3/8) Unknown	(3/8) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(7/8)
YES
XXIII	(246) 11 Bombing/Explosion	
(11/11)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	
Unknown	(2/11) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(11/11)
YES
XXIV	(247) 9 Bombing/Explosion	
(9/9)
Business	(3/9) Unknown	(3/9) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(5/9)
YES
XXV	(248) 8 Bombing/Explosion	
(8/8)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	(4/8)
Entertainment/Cultural/Stadi
um/Casino	(2/8)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(8/8)
YES
XXVI	(249) 5 Bombing/Explosion	
(5/5)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	(2/5)
Unnamed	
Civilian/Unspecified	(2/5)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/5)
YES
XXVII	(251) 5 Bombing/Explosion	
(5/5)
Business	(1/5) Restaurant/Bar/Café	(1/5) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Unknown	Explosive	Type	
(3/5)
YES
XXVIII	(252) 3 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/3)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	(1/3)
Unknown	(2/3) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(2/3)
NO
XXIX	(253) 4 Bombing/Explosion	
(4/4)
Maritime	(1/4) Oil	Tanker	(1/4) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/4)
YES
XXX	(254) 4 Bombing/Explosion	
(4/4)
Business	(1/4) Gas/Oil	(1/4) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/4)
NO
XXXI	(255) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	
(1/2),	Military	
Public	Area	(garden,	parking	
lot,	garage,	beach,	public	
building,	camp)	(1/2),	NATO	
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(2/2)
Vehicle	(1/2),	Grenade	(1/2) YES
XXXII	(256) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	
(1/2),	Military	
Unnamed	
Civilian/Unspecified	(1/2),	
Navy	(1/2)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(2/2)
Unknown	Explosive	Type	
(1/2),	Vehicle	(1/2)
NO
XXXIII	(257) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Military	(1/2),	
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	(1/2)
Military	Checkpoint	(1/2),	
Village/City/Town/Suburb	
(1/2)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(2/2)
Unknown	Explosive	Type	
(1/2),	Suicide	(carried	bodily	
by	human	being)	(1/2)
NO
XXXIV	(258) 5 Bombing/Explosion	
(5/5)
Military	(1/5) Military	Checkpoint	(1/5) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/5)
YES
XXXV	(259) 2 Bombing/Explosion	
(2/2)
Military	(1/2),	
Business	(1/2)
Marine	(1/2),	Unknown	(1/2) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(2/2)
YES
XXXVI	(260) 17 Bombing/Explosion	
(17/17)
Business	(7/17) Unknown	(5/17) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(17/17)
NO
XXXVII	(261) 4 Bombing/Explosion	
(4/4)
Military	(2/4) Military	Personnel	(soldiers,	
troops,	officers,	forces)	(1/4)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/4)
NO
  
 
Clusters n Attack type Target type Target sub-type Weapon type Weapon sub-type Unknown/In
dependent?
XXXVIII	
(263)
4 Bombing/Explosion	
(4/4)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	(1/4)
Marketplace/Plaza/Square	
(1/4)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(4/4)
YES
XXXIX	(264) 3 Bombing/Explosion	
(3/3)
Business	(1/3) Restaurant/Bar/Café	(1/3) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(2/3)
NO
XL	(265) 6 Bombing/Explosion	
(6/6)
Government	
(Diplomatic)	
(1/6)
International	Organization	
(peacekeeper,	aid	agency,	
compound)	(1/6)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(6/6)
Vehicle	(4/6) YES
XLI	(266) 8 Bombing/Explosion	
(8/8)
Police	(3/8) Police	Building	(headquarters,	
station,	school)	(3/8)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(7/8) YES
XLII	(267) 5 Bombing/Explosion	
(5/5)
Educational	
Institution	(2/5)
School/University/Educationa
l	Building	(2/5)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(5/5)
YES
XLIII	(268) 5 Bombing/Explosion	
(5/5)
Military	(2/5) Army	(2/5) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/5)
YES
XLIV	(269) 10 Bombing/Explosion	
(10/10)
Military	(3/10) NATO	(2/10) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(6/10) YES
XLV	(270) 8 Bombing/Explosion	
(9/9)
Military	(2/9) Military	
Barracks/Base/Headquarters/
Checkpost	(1/9)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(8/9)
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(5/8)
YES
XLVI	(272) 6 Bombing/Explosion	
(6/6)
Police	(2/6) Police	Building	(headquarters,	
station,	school)	(1/6)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(4/6) YES
XLVII	(273) 4 Bombing/Explosion	
(4/4)
Government	
(General)	(2/4)
Government	Personnel	
(excluding	police,	military)	
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/4)
YES
XLVIII	(274) 6 Bombing/Explosion	
(6/6)
Government	
(General)	(2/6)
Government	
Building/Facility/Office	(2/6)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(4/6) YES
XLIX	(275) 7 Bombing/Explosion	
(6/7)
Police	(3/7) Police	Building	(headquarters,	
station,	school)	(2/7)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(6/7) YES
L	(276) 4 Bombing/Explosion	
(4/4)
Government	
(General)	(2/4),	
Police	(2/4)
Government	Personnel	
(excluding	police,	military)	
(1/4)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(4/4)
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/4)
NO
LI	(277) 12 Bombing/Explosion	
(12/12)
Military	(6/12) Military	Recruiting	
Station/Academy	(3/12)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(7/12) YES
LII	(278) 15 Bombing/Explosion	
(15/15)
Government	
(General)	(4/15)
Police	Patrol	(including	
vehicles	and	convoys)	(2/15)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(13/15) YES
LIII	(279) 8 Bombing/Explosion	
(8/8)
Police	(5/8) Police	Building	(headquarters,	
station,	school)	(2/8)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(6/8) YES
LIV	(280) 13 Bombing/Explosion	
(13/13)
Military	(6/13) Military	Unit/Patrol/Convoy	
(2/13)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(11/13) YES
LV	(281) 9 Bombing/Explosion	
(9/9)
Military	(3/9) Politician	or	Political	Party	
Movement/Meeting/Rally	
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(6/9) YES
LVI	(282) 16 Bombing/Explosion	
(15/16)
Military	(5/16) Place	of	Worship	(4/16) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(8/16) YES
LVII	(283) 10 Bombing/Explosion	
(9/10)
Military	(5/10) Military	Unit/Patrol/Convoy	
(2/10)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(7/10) YES
LVIII	(284) 27 Bombing/Explosion	
(27/27)
Military	(10/27) Military	Unit/Patrol/Convoy	
(5/27)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(21/27) YES
LIX	(285) 13 Bombing/Explosion	
(12/13)
Government	
(General)	(4/13)
Unnamed	
Civilian/Unspecified	(3/13)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(10/13) YES
LX	(286) 18 Bombing/Explosion	
(18/18)
Police	(6/18) Police	Security	
Forces/Officers	(5/18)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(11/18) YES
LXI	(287) 31 Bombing/Explosion	
(31/31)
Military	(10/31) Police	Building	(headquarters,	
station,	school)	(4/31)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(21/31) YES
LXII	(288) 5 Bombing/Explosion	
(5/5)
Military	(2/5) Unnamed	
Civilian/Unspecified	(1/5)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(4/5)
YES
LXIII	(289) 18 Bombing/Explosion	
(18/18)
Police	(5/18) Police	Checkpoint	(2/18) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(9/18)
YES
LXIV	(290) 11 Bombing/Explosion	
(8/11)
Military	(3/11) Government	Personnel	
(excluding	police,	military)	
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(6/11) YES
LXV	(291) 16 Bombing/Explosion	
(16/16)
Business	(5/16) Hotel/Resort	(3/16) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(9/16) YES
LXVI	(292) 7 Bombing/Explosion	
(7/7)
Police	(3/7) Police	Security	
Forces/Officers	(2/7)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/7)
YES
LXVII	(293) 10 Bombing/Explosion	
(9/10)
Business	(3/10) Military	Unit/Patrol/Convoy	
(2/10)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(6/10)
YES
LXVIII	(294) 13 Bombing/Explosion	
(13/13)
Police	(4/13) Unknown	(3/13) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(12/13)
YES
LXIX	(295) 6 Bombing/Explosion	
(6/6)
Military	(2/6) Unknown	(2/6) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(3/6)
YES
LXX	(296) 9 Bombing/Explosion	
(9/9)
Religious	
Figures/Instituti
ons	(2/9)
Place	of	Worship	(2/9) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
e	(9/9)
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(5/9)
YES
LXXI	(297) 15 Bombing/Explosion	
(15/15)
Military	(4/15) Military	Unit/Patrol/Convoy	
(2/15)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(9/15) YES
LXXII	(298) 7 Bombing/Explosion	
(7/7)
Military	(2/7) Police	Patrol	(including	
vehicles	and	convoys)	(2/7)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(5/7)
YES
LXXIII	(299) 17 Bombing/Explosion	
(17/17)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	
Unknown	(4/17) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(10/17)
YES
LXXIV	(300) 11 Bombing/Explosion	
(11/11)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	
Procession/Gathering	
(funeral,	wedding,	birthday,	
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(6/11) YES
LXXV	(301) 16 Bombing/Explosion	
(16/16)
Police	(6/16) Police	Security	
Forces/Officers	(4/16)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(8/16),	
YES
LXXVI	(302) 18 Bombing/Explosion	
(18/18)
Police	(8/18) Police	Building	(headquarters,	
station,	school)	(4/18)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Vehicle	(9/18),	Suicide	
(carried	bodily	by	human	
YES
LXXVII	(303) 9 Bombing/Explosion	
(9/9)
Private	Citizens	
&	Property	(4/9)
Unnamed	
Civilian/Unspecified	(2/9)
Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(5/9)
YES
LXXVIII	
(304)
16 Bombing/Explosion	
(16/16)
Police	(7/16) Unknown	(4/16) Explosives/Bo
mbs/Dynamit
Suicide	(carried	bodily	by	
human	being)	(14/16)
YES
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According to our selection criteria, 78 suicide attack clusters could be identified within 
the Middle East and North Africa. 33  Of these, 57 clusters contained attacks either 
unattributed to, or perpetrated by an actor not formally affiliated with, a terrorist 
organisation. Twenty-one of these contained attacks that shared identical attack details 
and are possible candidates for further analysis to determine the likelihood of a 
copycat effect being present, as due to the limited amount of detailed information in 
the START database, we were unable to firmly conclude whether these individuals had, 
in fact, copied one another. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Graph 11: Sub-Saharan Africa, 1981–2007 
 
 
 
According to our selection criteria, one suicide attack cluster was identified within the 
region of Sub-Saharan Africa.34 However, this particular cluster contained attacks that 
were perpetrated on the same day and were thus not likely to be the result of prior 
publication of a preceding attack. With the exception of this cluster, no other suicide 
attack clusters could be identified within the region. 
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Evaluation of Findings 
 
By analysing almost 900 cases of terrorist suicide attacks across the world, using a 
mixed-method approach, we sought to assess whether a copycat effect could be 
established among suicide terrorist attacks. In order to tackle this pressing question, 
we assessed (I) whether suicide attacks occurred in regional clusters, (II) whether 
attacks occurring in one cluster employed similar methods, and (III) whether these were 
perpetrated by individuals not formally affiliated with terrorist organisations. 
 
Our mixed-method analyses did identify numerous clusters containing identical attacks 
occurring within a 30-day period across all regions, demonstrating the potential value 
of follow-up research on the topic, and especially encourages using rich qualitative 
(media) data to study single cases identified in this study in greater depth.  
 
What Should Be Next? 
 
Using open-source databases for social science research is not without flaws. As the 
START GTD is primarily based on media outlets, low-profile or older entries often lack 
detailed and potentially important information, such as the level of media attention 
focused on an incident occurring after its perpetration, in what language(s) the incident 
was covered, by what type(s) of media and to what intensity. Furthermore, as open-
source databases rely on media reporting as a primary source of information for their 
entries, potential reporting biases may influence eventual findings. Blackouts imposed 
by authoritarian regimes may also affect data availability. In the field of counter-
terrorism specifically, open-source databases – such as the GTD, in particular – also 
contain little information on government responses to terrorist attacks. Finally, and 
most importantly, the START GTD did not contain any information on the degree of 
publication surrounding suicide attacks. This has inhibited us from assessing the direct 
influence of media exposure on potential future attacks. Future research should 
establish some method of indexing, or another form of quantitative valuation of media 
coverage, when investigating the effect of the media on terrorist violence. A two-part 
research method, for example taking findings extracted from the database, might 
conduct a discourse analysis by trawling through a body of media literature in a given 
region. Such analyses could include the analysis of frequencies of word-schemas 
against an aggregated database of media sources in order to determine a statistical 
relationship. This kind of approach would make research findings from the database 
less speculative, and make research on a potential copycat effect more accurate. 
 
As our analysis particularly focused on subsequent attacks by unaffiliated individuals 
following attacks committed by specified terrorist organisations, we found the issue of 
missing data to be particularly impactful on our conclusions. Attacks in regions such as 
North America or Western Europe may enjoy higher degrees of media and criminal 
investigative attention, and as a result database entries on their attacks can be more 
accurate or complete. In contrast, we found that attacks in the Middle East region were 
more likely to be left unattributed to terrorist organisations, and may perhaps be due 
to the less (Western) media attention given to attacks in the region. Other issues, such 
as the misattribution or misclassification of attack details, may also impact our findings 
and challenge their validity. 
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Our analysis focused on the pre-social media period. Future research should also be 
expanded to the post-2007 period and include social media sites or online news 
aggregators in the media component of their analysis. The parameters of such a study 
could also be adapted accordingly, as the expansion and growing availability of online 
content may change the ways in which individual perpetrators may be exposed to, and 
triggered by, an inspiring terrorist suicide attack. The use of innovative big-data 
analytical methods such as systematic algorithm-based searches may also overcome 
some of the weaknesses of traditional quantitative analysis, such as our own need to 
include cases falling immediately outside a given interval period on a case-by-case 
basis. The combination of these rising tools in the future may open up new doors in 
terms of using media data in (counter-)terrorism research. A more refined approach 
might also counter the broad classifications of attack details such as weapons or target 
types whose high frequency might also have affected the validity of our findings. 
 
Our research demonstrates the value of incorporating open-data sources for research 
in (counter-)terrorism studies and other related social science fields. The inclusion of 
common big-data research techniques such as algorithmic data mining could also be 
used to complement future research, providing an innovative set of statistical methods 
that can provide answers for our most pressing questions – in particular those 
pertaining to the rise of the Leaderless Resistance Model in modern Islamic extremist 
terrorism and the challenging prevention limitations it poses for policymakers today. 
As demonstrated by our research, statistical analysis of today’s open-data sources can 
yield valuable insights into trends at a surface level, but has a limited capacity to be 
used for specialised research and, as a result, is most effective when used alongside 
other sources of data.  
 
Implications 
 
Although our analysis did not provide clear-cut support for a copycat effect among 
suicide terrorist attacks, we cannot rule out that media does not have any influence in 
these practices. Our statistical analysis identified a number of clustered attacks 
containing similar attack details but could not determine the presence of a copycat 
effect using the data alone. Until further, more detailed analyses can exclude potential 
contagion effects, we may wish to exercise caution in reporting on these events. 
 
The reasons for such caution are twofold: on the one hand, as Adam Lankford has 
argued elsewhere,35 individual perpetrators of suicide attacks may primarily be driven 
by suicidal ideations, rather than by ideological motivations. Executing a suicide attack 
may provide a socially approved way of ending their lives.36 In such cases, it may be 
argued that these suicidal individuals could be inspired by glorified, romanticised and 
detailed publications of suicide attacks that may inspire them to carry out a similar 
attack. Based on this assumption, suicide terrorism would follow the same contagion 
pathways as “regular” suicides. What follows is that media outlets should adhere to 
similar reporting guidelines for responsible media reporting.37 These include refraining 
from presenting acts of suicide terrorism and mass homicide as a cultural script. For 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
example, the perpetrator should not be framed as an at-risk individual who solved his 
or her frustrations by committing violent suicide. Linking their act of suicide terrorism 
to an aspect of their background may give future viewers the ability, through social 
learning, to gain solidarity with the perpetrator and potentially commit an act of suicide 
terrorism themselves. This point may be particularly important due to the rise of the 
Leaderless Resistance, and lone wolf models adopted by major terrorist organisations 
such as IS, whose individual perpetrators of terroristic violence operate outside known 
terrorist networks and as such fall largely within a blind spot of traditional intelligence 
systems and practices. 
 
The second reason for exercising caution when it comes to reporting on suicide 
terrorism takes a moralistic approach, and continues to be a widely debated topic 
among counter-terrorism experts today.38 Detailed reporting on such attacks provides 
terrorist organisations a wider platform for their aims and doctrines. While there is no 
evidence supporting the suggestion that media coverage of suicide terrorism cases 
increases their frequency in the same ways as coverage of suicide cases may increase 
the frequency of individual suicides, research within the field remains largely 
exploratory and in its early stages. As such, further attention should be directed 
towards the development and implementation of responsible media-reporting 
conventions as a largely precautionary measure, as well as to limit the spread of 
terrorist propaganda. 
 
The issue of the relationship between media coverage and terrorist violence is one of 
great importance today. Media coverage of suicide terrorism may not only provide 
terrorist organisations a platform through which their propaganda may be 
communicated, but can also give rise to further channels for future terrorist violence. 
Adapting reporting techniques to align with contemporary political information 
management and crisis communication strategies will deprive terrorist organisations 
of the media coverage necessary for them to project their power and achieve their 
strategic goals. Our analysis did not uncover sufficient evidence to classify suicide 
terrorism as a new form of suicidal behaviour, but rather suggested that it has a 
different dynamic and is thus characterised by different predictors compared to 
traditional suicide. As such, future research should investigate suicide terrorism 
through a lens of warfare or general violence rather than through one of suicide. 
Despite the clear need for further research to more concretely measure the threat of a 
copycat effect in instances of suicide terrorism worldwide, it is important for media 
practices to adjust at as early a point as possible in order to minimise impending 
security risks.  
 
Conclusion 
 
While general similarities across suicide terrorism cases attributed to terrorist 
organisations were analysed in regions with a smaller sample size, we were chiefly 
interested in individually perpetrated suicide terrorist attacks that followed a publicised 
suicide attack attributed to a terrorist organisation. Analysing almost 900 cases of 
suicide terrorism within the Global Terrorism Database, we did not uncover clear 
evidence supporting a copycat effect among the attacks included in the data set. In 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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spite of lack of hard evidence, our study uncovered various clusters of potential interest 
for future detailed inquiry, and provided methodological considerations for future 
studies using open-data sources in order to come to a complete understanding of the 
underlying dynamics of such violent attacks. 
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